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Printed in the United Kingdom at the University Press, Cambridge Cambridge University Press has no responsibility for the persistence or accuracy of URLs for external or third-party internet websites referred to in this publication, and does not guarantee that any content on such websites is, or will remain, accurate or appropriate. background it might be thought that consistency and (to a certain extent at least) predictability in litigation should be achieved through the use of the known methods of interpretation. That this is not always the case gives cause for concern: on the one hand critics of European integration sense (rightly or wrongly) judicial activism; on the other hand it can be argued that the Court is merely confronting the Member States, the EU's institutions and indeed individuals with the logical consequences of what has been agreed.
Conclusion 49
2 And yet further it is sometimes argued that the Court is not always willing to follow the line of logic and consistency to reach a result which conforms to perceived expectations, sacrificing coherence on the altar of political convenience: the Court stands then accused of uncommunautaire reasoning. © in this web service Cambridge University Press
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Preface
This book seeks to offer a critical perspective on the legal reasoning of the European Court of Justice (ECJ). In particular, it focuses on the question of the limits of legal reasoning: how far creativity and freedom from constraint can go in the task of legal reasoning by the EU judiciary. This question has two aspects to it: the epistemic or descriptive possibility of conserving versus creative interpretation and the normative desirability of conserving versus creative interpretation. The argument of the book is that interpretation by the judiciary linked to the understanding or interpretation of the law-maker is both epistemically possible and normatively desirable. This conserving (or orginalist or historical) approach to interpretation coheres much better with the rule of law and democracy, the twin pillars of accepted political morality in Europe, than the relatively creative, teleological approach to interpretation that is widely recognised to be the hallmark of the ECJ. It is in this sense that the book is 'critical' in its approach. However, it does not just engage in criticism, but also proposes an alternative methodology of interpretation that could be a practical guide for legal reasoning by the Court. This is a relatively unorthodox approach in EU scholarship. As Shaw has been one of the first to note, a dominant tendency in writing in EU studies is to eulogise the contribution of the ECJ to enhancing integration, with the 'language of love' being suitable to describe how many EU specialists view the Court.
1 This comment echoes other sporadic observations in the literature. Alter has commented that many EU law academics act as a lobby group for the promotion of the jurisprudence of the ECJ, 2 while Klabbers observes that the community of EU law scholars tends to be a close-knit one that resists alternatives to its basic assumptions. 3 Schepel has also very accurately captured this tendency, with the observation that critical approaches to the ECJ tend to be either denounced or ignored, and referred to the 'complex stranglehold' exercised by the ECJ on the academic literature. 4 Rasmussen, the best known critic of the ECJ, whose important work was strongly attacked in reviews, referred to the Court's 'privileged relationship with academia', 5 a climate of opinion that, Shaw further noted, meant 'few dared criticise the pre-eminent position of the Court of Justice'. 6 It is hoped that the present work may be just one contribution to a more balanced academic treatment of the ECJ, and that it will contribute to a more open and diverse debate on the proper exercise of the competence of one of Europe's most powerful institutions. The book grew out of a long-standing research interest in the issue of creativity and constraint in judicial interpretation, which I began to study as an undergraduate student. I continued this interest on the Master of International and Comparative Law Programme at the University of Uppsala, Sweden, from which I greatly benefited. I developed the research interest especially as the subject of my doctoral thesis, which I completed at Brunel University, London. There are a large number of people to whom I am indebted. First, I would like to say special thanks to Professor Roda Mushkat, my principal supervisor at Brunel and now at John Hopkins University. The professionalism, skill and all-round helpfulness that she brought to the task made a very big contribution to the success of the research and made enjoyable the task of PhD research, and I remain very indebted for this. 
people also deserve particular mention: Professor Tom Hadden, Queen's University Belfast, and Professor Abimbola Olowofoyeku, Brunel University. Professor Hadden was of help and support over several years, especially at one very important stage that facilitated the completion of my doctoral research. Professor Olowofoyeku was first a very helpful and supportive Head of School at Brunel Law School, and then a very fair and incisive internal examiner for my Brunel thesis. All three exemplify for me the values of professionalism, integrity and independence of mind that I would be like to emulate in my own career. I should also thank particularly the two external examiners at Brunel, Professor Christian Joerges (University of Bremen) and Professor Jo Shaw (University of Edinburgh), for their very helpful questions and comments on the parts of the thesis in the present work (although considerable parts were not in my Brunel thesis, and needless to say they do not necessarily endorse the parts that were), as well as for a fair and very thorough assessment of the thesis. Their own works were important sources I drew on in my research.
At Brunel, I would also like to thank the Library staff, who have been exceptionally helpful, especially Claire Grover, the Law Librarian, and Jo-Ann Nash, the Inter-Library Loans Librarian. Part of the research on which the book is based was facilitated by a PhD fees scholarship from the Department of Education of Northern Ireland and by a Modern Law Review Doctoral Scholarship (2006 Scholarship ( -2008 . In particular, I am grateful to Mr Bob Simpson, London School of Economics and Political Science, and Mrs Michelle Madden, Queen's University Belfast, for overcoming administrative difficulty and facilitating the scholarship from the Modern Law Review. I would also like to thank all those colleagues at Brunel who have assisted my work during the preparation of the book. Part of this research was conducted while a visiting scholar at the University of Navarra, Spain, and I am grateful to Professor Rafael Domigo and Dr Nicolá s Zambrana-Té var for providing me with this opportunity. Dr Nicolá s Zambrana-Té var and Dr Fernando Simó n Yarza also provided help subsequently, for which I also thank them.
I am very grateful to Siné ad Moloney, Joanna Breeze, and Richard Woodham of Cambridge University Press. Siné ad Moloney guided the publication process from the beginning with much tact and professionalism. All were patient with the extension of the submission deadline on several occasions. I would also like to thank Deborah Hey and Ramakrishna Reddy Syakam for their work on the manuscript. Further, I am very indebted to two anonymous reviewers from I would like to express my thanks and gratitude to my family for their support while I was writing this book: my parents (to whom the book is dedicated) and brothers Brian, Noel, Joe and Paul. In particular, my parents supported my education long after they were entitled to think their job in that respect was done.
Finally, the book has been written in the belief that discussion of legal reasoning and legal theory should be expressed as clearly as possible 7 (it is easy to get the impression that some writing in legal theory are pleased at the perceived inaccessibility of their work). The present work seeks to eschew this tendency, though it may well be that the end result falls short of the intention. The usual caveat applies: the content and any errors in the book are the sole responsibility of the author.
